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I. Introduction
In recent years, one of the greatest controversies in the
environmental regulatory field has revolved around the question of
whether or not to provide a privilege and penalty immunity to
regulated entities who voluntarily perform environmental audits in
order to prevent disclosure of their results and protect the audit
preparers.' Industries and other regulated entities have had no choice
but to rely upon the judicially created doctrines such as the attorney
client, work product, and self evidentiary privileges to protect the
documents in their audit reports from disclosure to the government or
third parties.2 However, the extent of protection that these privileges
offer for audit reports is often limited, and the industry's chance of
successfully asserting these privileges is low.3 Industries have
therefore lobbied state legislatures for a statutory based
self-evaluative privilege that would provide either a qualified
privilege from disclosure for the audit report results, immunity from
civil or criminal prosecutions, or both, should the report reveal any
environmental violations.4 These evidentiary privileges have spawned

I

See R. Kinnan Golemon & Laura D. Wolf, The State Factor: The New

Paradigmin EnvironmentalEnforcement, 22 AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL 1,1

(1996).
See John Davidson, Privilegesfor EnvironmentalAudits: Is Mum Really
the Word?, 4 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 116-123 (1995). See also John Calvin Conway,
Self-Evaluative Privilege and CorporateComplianceAudits, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
621, 631-633 (1995) (discussing the attorney and work product-based corporate
privileges).
2

See Davidson, supra note 2, at 116 (conceding that common law
privileges protect the confidentiality of environmental audits in limited
circumstances).
4
Oregon was the first state to enact audit privilege legislation. OR. REV.
STAT. § 468.963 (1996). As of October 1997, twenty states have adopted some
3

type of privilege legislation: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,

Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. In
addition, sixteen states have passed legislation providing penalty immunities for
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a battle between the states and the auditing industries on one side, and
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the
other. The EPA has recognized a penalty reduction for industries that
voluntarily perform environmental audits and make a timely effort to
achieve compliance with environmental laws. However, the agency
has expressly rejected the notion of an evidentiary privilege that
would protect the audit documents from disclosure.'
Part I of this article will present a brief description of what an
environmental audit is as well as the incentives that are associated
with voluntarily performed environmental audits. I will also include
an example of an environmental audit performed at a photoprocessing
facility and a closer look into a local environmental auditing firm. In
Part II, I will discuss the three judicially created privileges relied upon
by the industries for protection against disclosure of audit report
results: attorney-client, work product, and self-evidentiary. The
typical industry argument is that "[tihe current system discourages
audits and the identification of environmental compliance problems"
since it enables the government and third parties in private lawsuits
to use the audit results against the industry in any ensuing litigation.'
This discussion will incorporate the limitations that are often
associated with these privileges.

discovered violations. EnvironmentalAudit Immunity Laws: A State-by-State
Comparison, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 331 (June 13, 1997). Search also
performed in LEXIS, Codes Library, ALLCDE File.
5
Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and

Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,710 (1995). See also David
Sorenson, The U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency's Recent Environmental
Auditing Policy and PotentialConflict with State-CreatedEnvironmental Audit
PrivilegeLaws, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 483, 484 (1996) (explaining that, "[b]ecause

several states have recently passed laws creating an evidentiary privilege for
environmental audit documents, a potential for considerable conflict exists between
state and federal environmental enforcement programs.").
6
Golemon & Wolf, supra note 1, at 1. See also Jill A. Kotvis, Privilege,
Immunity, and EnvironmentalAudits in Texas, TEx. LAW., Oct. 14, 1996, at 22
("[C]ompanies have in many cases avoided internal auditing programs in order to
avoid preparation of a road map for agency or third party actions against them.").
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Part III of the article will introduce the statutory-based
evidentiary privilege and immunity legislation. This will include an
examination and analysis of New York State's Assembly Bill 3154,
which, if enacted, would provide a qualified evidentiary privilege for
environmental audit reports and an immunity provision for preparers
of the report.7 Part III will also involve a comparison of the proposed
bill to the EPA's Final Policy Statement, along with criticisms of
environmental audits. Part IV will explain why New York State
legislators should refuse to join the growing number of states who
have already adopted an evidentiary privilege for environmental audit
report materials as well as identify the shortcomings and possible
adversities surrounding evidentiary audit privileges. This explanation
will involve an evaluation of the audit statutes which were recently
passed in Texas, Michigan, and Idaho. These statutes are almost
identical to the proposed New York bill, and have also been the
subject of great debate between the states and the US Environmental
Protection Agency.
II. What is an Environmental Audit?
The rise in environmental laws and regulations has led to an
increase in the amount of environmental enforcement litigation
brought against industry and other regulated entities. These entities
are therefore searching for ways to ensure compliance with the
environmental standards and, at the same time, avoid additional
liability.' One way these entities have accomplished both objectives
See Assem. 3154, 220th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997). This bill
was proposed by Assemblyman Daniel J. Fessenden on Jan. 30, 1997, and was
7

referred to the Committee on Environmental Conservation for further proceedings.
It was recommitted to the Committee on Environmental Conservation on Jan. 7,
1998. A similar piece of evidentiary legislation was proposed by Senator Owen
Johnson on April 16, 1997. S. 4870,220th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 1997).
This was also referred to the Committee on Environmental Conservation.
However, this article will only discuss the ramifications of the Assembly bill.
8
See Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, EnvironmentalAudits and
Enforcement Policy, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 365, 365 (1992).
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is through the use of voluntary environmental audits. In its Final
Policy Statement, the EPA defines an environmental audit as a
"systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated
entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting
environmental requirements." 9
There are generally two types of environmental audits that
companies and other regulated entities may choose to perform, and it
is often in the company's best interest to perform both. The first is
known as the management audit. Management audits are complex,
and typically include a review of the risk control systems employed
by an industry to detect and remedy possible environmental
violations. ° This type of audit is designed to evaluate the company's
"environmental mission, goals, and objectives" as well as to develop
"training manuals, preventive maintenance programs... and total
quality management enhancements."" Therefore, the management
audit moves beyond mere concern for specific laws and focuses on a
full system for compliance with laws and regulations. 2
The second type of environmental audit is a compliance audit,
which focuses on existing and potential environmental hazards,
releases, and discharges in order for the company to comply with
environmental laws and regulations. 3 This audit is less
comprehensive than the management audit, and has been referred to

9

Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,710.

10

See Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 8, at 366. See also Heather L. Cook &

Robert R. Hearn, Putting Together the Pieces: A Comprehensive Examination of
the Legal andPolicy Issues of EnvironmentalAuditing, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 545,
549 (1994) ("[M]anagement audits 'test the nature of the company management
systems controlling environmental risks.' ").
II
Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 8, at 366.
12
See Michael Ray Harris, Promoting Corporate Self-Compliance: An
Examination of the Debate Over Legal Protectionfor EnvironmentalAudits, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 663, 671 (1996).
13
See Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 8, n.7, at 366. See also Cook & Hearn,

supra note 10, at 549 (stating that, "[t]he scope of the compliance audit is usually
limited to examining those aspects of the company which are currently regulated.").

262

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 5

as a "snapshot of a company's current and past compliance."' 4
Compliance audits are typically performed by an internal or outside
environmental specialist, who may attempt to identify nonregulatory
risks such as potential liability associated with toxic torts litigation
and citizen suits in addition to identifying the industry's compliance
with the regulations. 5
The voluntary environmental audits generate large quantities
of materials and documents. These are then compiled and the final
results are set forth in the industry's Environmental Audit Report.
The Environmental Audit Report is defined by the EPA as "the
analysis, conclusions, and recommendations resulting from an
environmental audit, but does not include data obtained in, or
testimonial evidence concerning, the environmental audit."' 6 An audit
report also contains information pertaining to observations and
opinions, such as notes, drafts, memoranda, and drawings. 7
A. Example of an Environmental Audit
An environmental audit often serves as an effective way for
a regulated industry to ensure that it is in compliance with
environmental laws and regulations. In July 1996, Ecology and
Environment, Inc. (hereinafter "E&E"), an auditing company, was
retained by a photoprocessing facility to perform a Phase I
Environmental Site Assessment.' The company was essentially hired
14

Harris, supranote 12, at 670-671.

Is

See Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 8, n.7, at 366.
Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66711.
17
See Assem. 3154, § 6-0101(2), 220th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
1997) (according to this proposed bill, the results from an industry's voluntary
audit are compiled in what is known as an Environmental Health and Safety (EHS)
16

Report).
is
See ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT, INC., EnvironmentalAssessment ofthe
PhotoprocessingFacility,(Aug. 1996). (E&E is headquartered in Lancaster, New

York, although this report is from a Maryland facility). This audit report was
provided to me courtesy of Ms. Linda Zablonty-Hurst, Chief Staff Attorney from
E&E. Due to client confidentiality, the name of the facility cannot be revealed.
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to identify any recognized environmental conditions (REC's), which
are defined as "existing releases, past releases, or any threat of a
release of a hazardous substance or petroleum products into structures
on the property or into the ground, groundwater, or surface waters"
in accordance with ASTM standards.' 9 In addition, E&E also assessed
several nonscope
issues such as radon and asbestos-containing
20
materials.
Before E&E performed the assessment, it reviewed the
information obtained from the facility's plant manager in response to
a preassessment questionnaire. 2' This questionnaire was primarily
designed to provide general information about the facility to the
auditing team and to identify areas that required further investigation.
After reviewing the questionnaire with the plant manager, an E&E
environmental professional performed a site reconnaissance and a
facility record review of information relative to the historical and
current uses of the site.22 The site reconnaissance consisted of "a
visual inspection of all structures at the property, a walk around the
' Following the
entire facility and a drive-by of adjacent properties."23
site visit to the photoprocessing facility, E&E performed telephone
interviews with the facility's Building Maintenance Technician as
well as the Maryland State Department of Environment.24
The company's final audit report consisted of three main
sections: record review, facility description, and summary of findings.
To assist E&E with the record review, the company subcontracted
with Environmental Risk Information and Imaging Services (ERIIS).
19

Id. at 1-1.

20

See id

21

See id. at 1-2. (A copy of the questionnaire was not attached to the

materials I received from Ms. Zablonty-Hurst).
2n
See id.See also J. Wray Blattner & Gary M. Bramble, Environmental
ManagerAvoiding CriminalLiabilities, 101 CHEM. ENGINEERING 127, 130 (June
1994) (stressing that, "During the on site review, communication is key. This

includes communication both among audit-team members and between the audit
team and facility personnel.").
23

ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT, INC., supra note 18, at 1-2.

24

See id.

264

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 5

A 1955 aerial photograph of the area and a 1965 United States
Geological Survey (USGS) map were employed in conjunction with
a database search to uncover nearby facilities containing underground
storage tanks." In E&E's judgment, though, none of these sites
presented an environmental threat to the photoprocessing facility.
Several other records were provided by the photoprocessing facility,
which were in turn reviewed by E&E. These records included: waste
shipping documents, an asbestos survey, a discharge authorization
permit, and chemical inventory lists and material safety sheets? 6 This
review was necessary in order for the auditing company to have a
thorough understanding of what the photoprocessing facility is
allowed to do, or is prohibiting from doing, in order to determine
whether or not the plant is in compliance with environmental
regulations.
The facility description identified the location and ownership
of the facility as well as the environmental characteristics of the site.
For example, E&E found that the topography of the area sloped away
from the facility and that the groundwater flow direction was radially
away from the building. Also, there were no wetlands, or other
significant environmental features in the vicinity?7 The site presently
serves as a photoprocessing facility located in a commercial and
possibly light industrial area. However, E&E's review revealed that,
prior to construction of the existing building, the property was
farmland.28
Ecology and Environment's summary of findings mainly
focused on the hazardous substances and petroleum products which
are part of the photoprocessing operations. 9 These findings were
then detailed in an appendix to the audit report. The photoprocessing
chemicals are stored in tanks in the chemical mixing area of the
facility's basement. This area has a tile floor with a series of drains to
25
26
27

28
29

See id. at 2-1.
See id. at 2-2.
See id.at 3-1.
See id.at 3-2.
See id. at 4-1.
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collect the releases. Spent chemical mixtures are discharged to the
sanitary sewer system after pH adjustment, in conjunction with a
sewer discharge permit." However, E&E found evidence of
incidental chemical releases of fixing solution into the soils and/or
groundwater due to leaks in the floor drains. Some of these chemicals
contained cyanide or silver.31 Also, it is possible that caustic and/or
acid mixtures have escaped from wash racks located at the edge ofthe
chemical mix area, and have contaminated the soil beneath the
facility.32
E&E also reported on nonscope issues, such as radon and
asbestos-containing materials. For example, the company observed
that radon levels within the facility may exceed those allowed by the
EPA, and therefore pose a health threat to workers.33 E&E identified
the sources of asbestos-containing materials to include pipe and boiler
insulation, among others. 34 However, the company was unable to
quantify the amount of materials present. It did admit that there may
be "considerable amounts" located in utility areas and throughout the
building. 35 The conclusions from E&E's Phase I Environmental Site
Assessment revealed no evidence of REC's in connection with the
photoprocessing facility, except for the already mentioned chemical
releases and possible excessive radon concentrations.
In a typical environmental audit, these conclusions and
findings will be evaluated in order to determine whether or not the
facility is in compliance with environmental laws and regulations.
Facility personnel will receive the audit findings and management
will be provided with a written report outlining the facility's
compliance status. 36 The written report is generally divided into two

30

31
32

33
34
35
36

See id. at A-3.
See id. at 4-1, 4-3.
See id. at A-4.

See id. at A-7.
See id
See id.
See Maryanne DiBerto, The ABC's of Auditing, 7

WATER, ENV'T AND

TECH. 56, 57 ( 1995); See also Blattner and Bramble, supranote 22, at 130 (noting
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parts. The first is the objective analysis section. This is simply a
descriptive report, and may contain a statement of the audit's scope,
an evaluation of the regulated processes, a list of all permits,
penalties, and notices of violations, and the team's observations on
the possibility of future compliance problems.37 The second part is
the subjective analysis, and this will culminate in the creation of the
industry's formal response to the audit report results.3 8
1. Example of an Audit Consulting Firm
Leader Environmental, Inc. is an environmental consulting
firm with offices in New York State and Pennsylvania that provides
various services to its clients, notably regulatory compliance audits. 9
The company has demonstrated technical expertise in fields such as:
hydrogeology, air quality management, solid and hazardous waste
management and site reclamation.4"
Leader has developed an environmental site survey form
which is often prepared at the request of counsel and is clearly
marked "privileged and confidential.""' The form first requests a
description of the previous land use and then the current condition of
the land.42 Health and safety concerns, including questions about
asbestos use and emergency response, first aid and fire protection,

that, after a formal audit report is issued to management, "management has the
information in hand to make judicious decisions about improving environmental
performance.").
37
See Harris, supra note 12, at 678-79.
38
39

See id.
Handout from Leader Environmental, Inc., from presentation at University
at Buffalo School of Law on Feb. 20, 1997. A copy of the handout was provided
by Professor Errol Meidinger.
40
See id.
41
See id.
42
See id Some of the requests pertaining to the property's condition include:
(1) Describe any historical spills, including the quantity released, where the release
occurred, and any response actions taken;... (4) Describe housekeeping (i.e. are
wastes stored around the facilities, are pumps full of sludge....
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follow on the checklist.43 The majority of Leader's form consists of
questions regarding environmental issues, such as air and water.'
The section entitled "Waste Disposal" is quite detailed, requiring the
preparer to describe the waste stream, report the quantity generated,
and identify the disposal method and location.45
B. Incentives to Voluntarily Perform Environmental Audits
In its December 22, 1995 Final Policy Statement, the EPA
explained that its policy is to encourage regulated entities to
voluntarily discover, disclose, and correct environmental violations.46
If environmental audits are not mandated by the EPA, why would a
regulated entity choose to voluntarily perform an audit? The answer
may be found with the incentives that these audits provide to the
regulated entity.
The incentives an entity may receive through an
environmental audit cover a wide spectrum. They may range from
reductions in operating costs to the avoidance of a criminal
prosecution by the federal government.47 In its Final Policy
Statement, the EPA states that it will not seek gravity-based, or
punitive, penalties for violations of federal environmental laws when
the regulated entity satisfies all of the nine conditions set forth in
Section D of the statement, such as voluntary and prompt disclosure
to the EPA as well as prevention of recurrence.48 Where the regulated
entity meets all of the conditions except the first, the EPA will reduce
the gravity-based penalties by 75%!9 This is intended to provide
43
44
45

See id.
See id.

See id. These three requirements apply to both hazardous and

nonhazardous waste.
46

47
48

See Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66706 (emphasis added).
See Cook & Hearn, supra note 10, at 554.
See Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66711-12.

See id at 66,708; see, e.g., Spirit of the Law Won't be Enough to Satisfy
EPA Audit Policy,According to New Interpretive Guidance,PESTICIDE & TOXIC
49

CHEM. NEWs, Jan. 22, 1997 (relating that a TSCA Inventory Update Rule
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some comfort to the industries, which may then encourage them to
voluntarily monitor their processes and perform audits without fear
of costly penalties.
Industries and other regulated entities who voluntarily
perform environmental audits also benefit from an increase in public
confidence which may subsequently lead to an increase in financial
investment with the business. This is the "good neighbor" concept
where industries with environmentally conscious practices will be
positively viewed and may be favorably dealt with by certain
segments of society. For example, open scrutiny and detailed
knowledge of a facility's conditions provide assurance for
stockholders and creditors and speed negotiations for the sale of an
asset or the establishment of a loan with a lending institution. 0 An
audit may enable the entity to retain consumer loyalty at the retail
level and to solicit valuable contracts from corporations who consider
environmental awareness in their purchasing and contracting
practices." This then translates into growth as well as a potential
increase in profits for the regulated entity.
Environmental audits also serve as a form of prevention or
pro-action. The regulated entity can reduce the risk of fines and
litigation costs by identifying and correcting noncompliance before
the government or a private citizen initiates action. 2 The EPA has'
explained that it "will not recommend to the Department of Justice or
other prosecuting authority that criminal charges be brought against
a regulated entity" as long as the entity satisfies all of the conditions
in Section D of its Final Policy Statement. 3 However, the EPA
stresses that this applies only to "good actors." If corporate officials
are consciously involved in, or willfully blind to, violations or

disclosure by Cenex, Inc. led to a 75% reduction of a proposed penalty from
$318,750 to $106,250.).
50
See David Ronald, The CaseAgainst anAudit Privilege,9 NAT'L. ENVTL.
ENF. J., Sept. 1994, at 3, 5.
s1
See id.at 5.
52
See id.
53
Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711.
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conceal or condone compliance, the EPA's policy does not apply. 4
The EPA also reiterated that it will not routinely request audit reports
to initiate civil or criminal investigations, unless the agency has
independent evidence of a violation."
I1. Privileges for Environmental Audit Reports
After the environmental audit has been performed, the results
have been discussed between the industry and the audit team, and the
results of the audit have been compiled into the final report, the
industry is faced with the question of what to do now. What if the
audit report reveals that the industry is in violation of an
environmental regulation? Should the industry disclose this to the
EPA, abide by the requirements set forth in the agency's Final Policy
Statement, and hope to receive favorable treatment from the agency?
Or should the industry refuse to disclose the violation and instead
claim that the results are privileged only after the state or a private
citizen demands to see the results from the audit?
In the early 1990's, the Coors Brewing Company conducted
an 18-month, $1.5 million environmental audit which uncovered a
violation in its emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs).
Specifically, it discovered that the beer-making process is about "17
'
times more polluting than the government thought it was."56
Coors
voluntarily reported the noncompliance, which it asserted was not
required to be reported under the EPA guidance document, and was
subsequently fined by the Colorado Department of Health for

54

55

See id. at 66,707.
See id at 66,708. Again, the EPA reiterates that "an audit which results

in prompt correction clearly will reduce liability, not expand it." ld.
56
Alexander Volokh, Tastes Great! More Polluting!States try to Protect
Voluntary 'EnvironmentalAudits,' REASON FOUNDATION, Jan. 1996, at 16. See
also Elisabeth M. Kirschner, Self-Incrimination Remains Major Problem With
EnvironmentalAudits, 72 CHEM. & ENGINEERING NEws 13 (1994) (stating that,
"The company's permit did not include those ethanol emissions, because EPA had
assumed that emissions from bottling would be negligible.").
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violation of the state air pollution laws.57 Coors argued that the fine
was excessive because it was being penalized for voluntarily
informing the EPA and the state health department of a discovery
that was unlikely to have occurred without the environmental audit.58
The liability that stemmed from the Coors voluntary
disclosure has since resulted in great anxiety among other industries
performing voluntary environmental audits. The industries are
concerned that the results obtained in their audit reports will establish
"a road map for agency or third party actions." 9 Many regulated
entities have admitted that the possibility of substantial fines and
criminal or civil sanctions have prevented the industries from carrying
out an audit. In fact, more than half of the 118 Indiana manufacturers
polled in regards to why they chose not to perform environmental
audits, cited fear as the major reason.6" A survey conducted by Price
Waterhouse revealed that nearly two-thirds of the companies who
currently perform environmental audits would increase such programs
if penalties were eliminated for any problems that the company
aggressively identified, reported, and corrected.6' Industries are
therefore searching for some type of guaranteed protection for the
results contained in their audit reports.

See Kirschner, supra note 52, at 13 ("But after Coors reported its
surprising findings--along with a commitment for emissions controls--the company
was slapped with a $1 million fine.n); see also Cook & Hearn, supra note 10,
n. 111, at 561 (Coors settled with the Colorado Department of Health after almost
seven months of negotiations, agreeing to pay $237,000 and to reduce VOC
emissions in its facility).
57

58
See Virginia Morton Creighton, Comment: Colorado'sEnvironmental
Atudit PrivilegeStatute: Striking the AppropriateBalance?, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.

443, 461 (1996).
59
Kotvis, supra note 6, at 22.
60
See Kirschner, supra note 52, at 15.
61

EliminationofPenaltiesCould Lead to More EnvironmentalAuditing, PR

NEWSWIRE AssociATION, Apr. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
PRNews File. The survey, The Voluntary Environmental Audit Survey of US.

Businesses, was completed by Price Waterhouse LLP in February 1995 and
published in March 1995. A total of 369 companies participated in the survey.
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A. Privileges Under Common Law
In the past, industries have relied upon three common law
privileges to protect themselves against disclosure of audit materials.
These are the attorney-client, work product, and self-evaluation or
critical self analysis privileges.62 These common law privileges are
employed in limited circumstances to protect the confidentiality of
environmental audits, and often with little success.63
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
The Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to "encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration ofjustice."64 The attorney-client privilege generally
applies where (1) a company seeks legal advice from an attorney
acting in his or her capacity as an attorney, and (2) the
communications at issue relate to that purpose, are made in
confidence, and are intended by the client to be protected from
disclosure.65
Recently, regulated industries have argued that the
attorney-client privilege should be applied to protect the contents of
their environmental audit reports from disclosure. A federal district
court outlined the rules for applying this privilege towards an
environmental audit report.66 The privilege will apply only if four
62

See Davidson, supra note 2, at 116-123; see also Carol Basri & Benjamin

Nahoum, Update on How In-House Counsel Can Use and Expand the Privileges,
THE METROPOLITAN CORP. CouNs., June 1996 (explaining the basic common law

privileges available to the communications and work of corporate counsel).
63
See Davidson, supranote 2, at 116.
64
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
See John T. Kolaga, New York Joins Battle Over EnvironmentalAudit
Reports, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 27, 1994, at 1.
65

See Cameron v. General Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D. 581, 584-85 (D.S.C.
1994), modified,In re General Motors Corp., 61 F.3d 256 (4 Cir. 1995). Note that

6
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criteria are met by the party. First, the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client. Second, the person to whom the
communication was made must be a bar member, or his subordinate,
and is acting as a lawyer in connection with the performance of the
audit. Third, the communication must be directed to the attorney by
his client to secure a legal opinion, legal services, or assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not for the purpose of committing a crime
or tort. Finally, the client cannot have claimed or waived the
privilege. 67 The court also stressed that not every piece of
information may be immune from discovery under the attorney-client
privilege, but rather only those communications deemed
"confidential."68
However, the courts have been very hesitant to apply this
privilege to environmental audit materials, and often refuse to
recognize certain communications as "confidential." In order for a
regulated entity to successfully argue that an attorney-client privilege
should be extended to the communications contained within its
environmental audit report, the entity has the burden of proving that
outside counsel was involved from the beginning of the audit.69 The
attorney must have been receiving the audit information in order to
provide legal advice or services.7" For example, in United States v.
Chevron US.A.,7 the United States sought to discover any documents
pertaining to Chevron's compliance with the National Emission
Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for benzene.72
Chevron argued that the documents contained in its internal audit
reports were protected against discovery because the senior counsel

the Cameron court explains that it is following the test as originally set forth in

United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
67
68
69
70

71

See id. at 584-85.
See id. at 585.
See Davidson, supranote 2, at 119.

See id. at 118.
United States v. Chevron U.S.A., No. 88-6681, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

12267 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
See id. at *13.

72
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of its environmental group helped prepare them.73 The court disagreed
and refused to apply the attorney-client privilege. This holding was
based upon the fact that the senior counsel was not involved with the
audit as an attorney. It was not sufficient that the attorney was present
during the audit or communicated with the client. The communication
must have been "between the client and attorney in his or her capacity
as an attorney rather thanas, for example, a "business advisor" in
order to come within the scope of the attorney-client privilege."'74
It is interesting to note the apparent contradiction that arises
from the requirement that an attorney be employed throughout the
environmental audit process in order for the attorney-client privilege
to apply. Since the main purposes of conducting a voluntary audit are
to evaluate the industry's internal processes and ensure compliance
with environmental laws and regulations, it seems that the use of
counsel would be unnecessary. It appears that the industry would
somehow have to already recognize there is a violation, or at least
have a strong suspicion that a violation may be uncovered from the
audit, and therefore employ an attorney out of fear that the audit
results would be disclosed during subsequent litigation. An industry
which was unaware that its processes were in violation of an
environmental law or regulation would see no reason to hire an
attorney during the audit, therefore waiving the attorney-client
privilege, and be unable to rely on the privilege to protect the audit
report results in the future.

See id.at *17-18. See also Davidson,supra note 2, at 119.
Chevron U.S.A., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267 at *18. But see Olen
Properties Corp. v. Sheldahl Inc., No. 91-6446, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7125 (C.D.
Cal. 1994). Here, the federal magistrate held that an environmental audit report was
protected by the attorney-client privilege because it had been prepared by the
73
74

company's counsel in order to "secure ...an opinion of law." Id.at *3.
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2. Work Product Privilege

The work product privilege75 differs from the attorney-client
privilege in several respects. First, the goal of the privilege differs
from that of the attorney-client privilege. The work product doctrine
is intended to encourage careful and thorough trial preparation by an
attorney without fear that an opponent will be able to discover these
trial preparation matters.76
While the attorney-client privilege is often invoked to protect
the communications between a client and his or her attorney, the work
product privilege may not always guarantee protection of these
discussions." However, this privilege is broader in scope than the

attorney-client privilege. It may encircle communications between
privileged parties as well as extend to "opinion" work such as the
attorney's or a representative of the attorney's mental thought
processes. 7 8 The courts have generally held that opinion work, as
opposed to "non opinion" work, will be protected against disclosure.79
The work product privilege is found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See also
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, (1947) (leading case on the work product
doctrine; states that the privilege applies to "interviews, statements, memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs..." but readily admits
that" [w]here relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file
and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case,
discovery may properly be had.").
75

76

77
78

See Kolaga, supranote 65.

See Conway, supra note 2, at 633.

See Davidson, supra note 2, at 119.

See Cameron v. General Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D. 581 (D.S.C. 1994),
modified, In re General Motors Corp., 61 F.3d 256 (4' Cir. 1995):
79

Work product [is divided] into two parts... the pure work product of
an attorney insofar as it involves 'mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions or legal theories... concerning litigation' is immune...All
other documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial may be discovered, but only on a showing of
'substantial need.'
Id. at 588 (quoting National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967
F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992)).
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The work product privilege, like the attorney-client privilege,
is not absolute. The privilege will only apply to work product that is
generated by an attorney "in anticipation of litigation or for trial. 8
Regulated industries have encountered great difficulty in asserting
work product privileges for their audit report materials mainly
because of the privilege's requirement of preparation "in anticipation
of litigation." This requirement is often narrowly construed, and
refers to litigation that is "imminent."'" The purpose behind an
environmental audit report seems to be at odds with the work product
privilege. This is because environmental audit reports are conducted
for non-litigation reasons, such as to ensure compliance or improve
plant efficiency." The privilege may provide protection to audits that
are prepared when a company is involved in, or foresees a lawsuit or
prosecution, but not to audits that are prepared by a regulated entity
during their regular course of business.83
3. Self-Evaluation or Critical Self-Analysis Privilege
The self-evaluation or critical self-analysis privilege
(hereinafter "self-evaluative") was first introduced in Bredice v.
Doctor'sHospital,Inc.84 In this case, the court held that the minutes
and reports from a hospital review board meeting were protected from
discovery in a wrongful death action. The court reasoned that the
purpose of the board meeting was the "improvement, through
self-analysis, of the efficiency of medical procedures and techniques"
and that there was an "overwhelming public interest" in the hospital

80

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

81

See Conway, supranote 2, at 633. ("This limits the applicability of the

doctrine to crisis and near-crisis situations. Although an actual suit or indictment
may be pending, the theory behind the doctrine respects the adversarial arena and

the need for privacy in preparing for the litigation battlefield.").
See Davidson, supranote 2, at 120.
82
83
See id.
84
Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
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conducting confidential self-analysis during those meetings.85 The
central idea from this case is that self-analytical material will be
privileged if there is a strong public interest that encourages a free
exchange of information during the self-evaluation, and that
discovery of this information would discourage self-evaluative
efforts.8 6
The courts have slowly broadened the scope of the
self-evaluative privilege to reach environmental audits. In this
context, regulated entities argue that the disclosure of documents
reflecting candid self-examination will deter or at least discourage
environmental investigations intended to advance the entity's legal
compliance." The courts will usually extend the self-evaluative
privilege where regulated entities can prove that the information
resulted from a self-critical analysis, the public has a strong interest
in preserving the free flow of information sought, and the flow of this
information would be curtailed if discovery were allowed.88
The self-evaluative privilege has been applied to
environmental audit reports with greater success89 than the
attorney-client or work product privileges, but even this privilege has
its limitations. The privilege only applies to evaluations that would
otherwise be "chilled" if disclosed. This presumes that the fear of
future liability would discourage a party's frankness during the
environmental audit, and consequently have a detrimental
repercussion on the audit's effectiveness. 9' However, even this
presumption has been challenged. For example, it has been suggested
that since candid disclosures may result in disciplinary measures
85

86

87

Id.at 250-51.

Id.at 251.
Kolaga, supra note 65, at 1.

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 388 (D.Md. 1994).
See Cook & Hearn, supra note 10, at 581 (explaining that this privilege
does not require that an attorney deal with all of the material during the
environmental audit and the "anticipation of litigation" problem is avoided since
88
89

companies usually perform audits for self-evaluative purposes.).
Conway, supra note 2, at 635-636.
9,
Id. at 635.
90
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within the regulated entity itself, potentially candid disclosures are
already deterred.92
While the courts have been more willing to apply the
self-evaluative privilege when environmental audit reports are
mandatedby the government, they may still extend the privilege to
voluntary
audits, but with
greater resistance.
This
mandatory/voluntary distinction raises the question of fairness in
environmental policy. If an entity voluntarily engages in self-analysis
that encourages its compliance with the law and appears to behave in
a more socially desirable manner as compared to an entity who
performs a mandatory audit but does so begrudgingly, why should the
first entity .be denied the privilege?93 There is definitely a negative
incentive created by limiting the self-evaluative privilege since
entities who are not mandated to perform audits may opt never to
voluntarily perform them. This would achieve the exact opposite
result of what the EPA sought to obtain in its Final Policy Statement:
voluntary, self-initiated audits in order to further environmental
compliance. 94
Another limitation of the self-evaluative privilege, as it
applies to environmental audit reports, is that the protection
encompasses non-factual materials only." Because the privilege is
designed to promote open and candid generation of subjective,
evaluative materials, objective data from the same groups performing
an audit will not receive the privilege. The concept is that the plaintiff

Id. at 637. It should be noted that this section cited to is referring to
mandatory environmental audits, but the argument can easily be made with respect
to voluntary audits.
92

Id. at 638.
Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
See In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197,205 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(stating that the self-evaluative privilege is not absolute, but rather applies only to
93
94
95

"the analysis or evaluation itself'). See also Conway, supra note 2, at 639
(explaining that the self-evaluative privilege does not protect the underlying facts

or documents that simply contain recitations of the facts).
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or government body should be entitled to factual information during
discovery.96
In order to ensure that certain audit report material will be
protected against disclosure to third parties, auditors often attempt to
separate the fact component from the evaluation.97 This distinction is
often extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible to achieve.
Corporations and other regulated entities realize that one of the
greatest liabilities created by an audit report is that it assembles many
of the wrongs or potential violations into one document.9" Therefore,
these entities want to present the facts in such a way that they cannot
be used as evidence if a violation is alleged by prosecutors and third
parties against the auditing industry. Often, "facts may be presented
in such a way as to create, mold, or express opinions" and "[t]he facts
that are gathered, and the opinions expressed about those facts,
ultimately reflect each other... disclosing either one may reveal the
essence of the other." 99
The difficulty that regulated entities often encounter when
they attempt to assert the self-evaluative privilege against the
government is that the policy of such a privilege runs counter to the
"broad discovery" concept involved in litigation. ° There is a balance
that must be maintained between the prosecution's needs and the
unchilled flow of information contained in an audit report.' For the
government, this usually translates into a balance between its rights
96

97
98

99

See Conway, supra note 2, at 639.
See id. at 640.

See id.
Id.

100
See id. See also Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. 66706, 66710
(1995) (justifying the EPA's opposition to any type of privilege for environmental
audit reports by quoting the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 710, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed.2d 1039 (1974): "these exceptions to the
demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth." See also Ronald,
supra note 46, at 3 (stating that a privilege would also "run[ ] counter to the public
disclosure trends in environmental law over the last several years.").
101
See Conway, supra note 2, at 640.
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to enforce state or federal environmental statutes and the entity's
interests in avoiding litigation. However, the self-evaluative privilege
is rarely upheld in a lawsuit involving the government, and when it
has been applied to environmental audits, it only protects past
evaluations. 10 2 Therefore, the privilege has not had great success
when applied to voluntary environmental audits, which are a form of
proactive planning.
IV. State-Created Privileges and Immunities
The issue of a statutory self-evaluative or evidentiary privilege
for environmental audits has arisen out of both the limitations of the
judicially recognized privileges, as well as the perception that the
audits may be used against the industry by regulators in enforcement
actions or by third parties in private lawsuits.0 3 Business interests

102

See United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990), which

evidenced the tension between the government's right to enforce and the industry's
desire to avoid litigation. In this case, the court affirmed the United States
Magistrate's finding that the self-evaluative privilege could not be asserted by the
industry in a discovery motion brought by the government under the Clean Water
Act. The court justified this by stating that Congregs, pursuant to the Clean Water
Act, made "an explicit declaration of public policy" concerning the navigable
waters of the United States. The court reasoned that the application of the
self-evaluative privilege would "effectively impede the [EPA] Administrator's
ability to enforce the Clean Water Act, and would be contrary to stated public
policy." Id. at 10. But see Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D.
522 (N.D. Fla. 1994). Here, Reichhold asserted that thirteen documents resulting
from audits of its plant were protected from discovery under the self-evaluative
privilege. 1d, at 524. The court admitted that pollution posed a public health risk,
and that there is a strong public interest in promoting voluntary identification and
remediation of industrial pollution. ld at 526. Therefore, Reichhold was granted
a limited privilege for "retrospective analyses of past conduct, practices, and
occurrences, and the resulting environmental consequences."Id. at 527. However,
the court was careful to explain that evaluations of the potentialenvironmental
risks of an action are not immune to discovery.
103
See Golemon & Wolf, supra note 1, at 1. See also EnvironmentalAudit
Immunity Laws: A State-by-State Comparison,supra note 4, at 331 (Sixteen states
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and other regulated entities have therefore made efforts at the state
level to enact legislation that would create evidentiary privileges for
their audit report results." 4 Generally, the state statutes can be
divided into two categories: those that provide only a qualified
evidentiary privilege for the documents related to an environmental
audit report, and those that provide a qualified evidentiary privilege
and immunity from civil and criminal prosecution for the person or
entity who discloses a violation.'05 These statutory privileges and
immunities have been the focus of much debate, primarily because
they appear to be inconsistent with the goals of the EPA in its Final
Policy Statement regarding environmental audits.0 6
A. The EPA's View on Statutory Privileges and Immunities
On December 22, 1995, the EPA issued its Final Policy
Statement with respect to environmental audits. 7 Although the
agency provides for a reduction in penalties for industries that
discover violations as a result of voluntary environmental audits, the
EPA remains opposed to the establishment of a statutory evidentiary
privilege for audit documents.0 8 According to the EPA, privilege
invites secrecy, which runs contrary to the openness required to build
public trust in an industry's ability to police itself. Also, a privilege
would allow defendants to claim as "audit material" almost any
evidence that the government would need to establish a violation and
which have enacted legislation providing for protection against disclosure of audit
reports have also provided immunity of some type.).
104
See John H. Cushman, Jr., Many States Give Polluting Firms New
Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at I ("Urgedon by a coalition of big
industries, one state after another is adopting legislation to protect companies from

disclosure or punishment when they discover environmental offenses at their own
plants.").
105
106

See Sorenson, supra note 5, at 492-493.
See Volokh, supra note 56, at 16 ("The EPA opposes the laws because

they make life tougher for environmental law enforcement.").
107
See Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
108
See id. at 66,710.
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would actually result in increased litigation, as the parties argued over
what materials were within the scope of the privilege. 9
While the EPA does not expressly forbid state-created
privileges for environmental audit documents, it does voice its
disapproval of state legislation that does not include the basic
protections to public health and the environment and that
compromises the ability of the state to execute federal environmental
statutes. 10 This is not surprising, since it is both the scope and
purpose of the federal environmental laws, administered by the EPA,
which create an inherent conflict with state privilege legislation."'
Federal environmental laws grant the EPA authority to compel a
company to provide any information reasonably required to enforce
environmental statutes."' For example, the Clean Air Act broadly
states that whenever it is necessary to carry out the objectives of the
Act, the EPA administrator or another authorized representative can
"require the person who owns or operates any emission source...
who the Administrator believes may have information ...or who is
subject to any requirement of this chapter to... provide such other
information as the Administrator may reasonably require.""' 3
109

See id The EPA makes an interesting argument in opposition to privilege

legislation. The agency alleges that a state-based privilege may "cloak" the
underlying facts such as health studies and contaminated sediment data found in
audit reports. While the government may be able to gain access to the reports, the
absence of the underlying facts would impair the government in its determination
of the reports' accuracy. 1d.
110

II

See id.
See Christina Austin, State EnvironmentalAudit PrivilegeLaws: Can

EPA Still Access EnvironmentalAudits in FederalCourts?, 26 ENVTL. L. 1241,

1246-1247 (Winter 1996).
112

See id.at 1246.

Id. Note that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
provides even broader access, stating that in order to enforce the Act, EPA, or a
state with an authorized hazardous waste program, can request "any person who
generates, stores, treats, transports, disposes of, or otherwise handles or has handled
hazardous waste... [to] furnish information relating to such wastes and permit
[EPA] ...
at all reasonable times to have access to, and to copy all records relating
to such wastes." Id,
113
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Recently, the EPA has identified Texas, Idaho, and Michigan
as states with environmental audit laws that prevent compliance with
federal statutes such as the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act." 4
In fact, the EPA has been accused of blackmailing these states and
others that have a strong audit privilege legislation'.. and the agency
has reiterated its authority to bring independent action against
regulated entities for violations of federal law regardless of state
immunity laws."6
EPA regulators have warned state legislators that the agency
may step in and oversee the enforcement of air pollution and other
environmental programs if states adopt or continue to enforce an audit
privilege statute that the EPA construes as weakening state
enforcement of the federal program in question. 17 Most of the
"4
See EPA Statement on State Enforcement, Impact of Audit
Immunity/Privilege Law Dated Feb. 14, 1997 (last visited May 28, 1998) <
http://www.arentfox.com>. See also R. Kinnan Golemon, Power Practice; Texas'
Self-Audit Privilege Disdained by EPA, TEx. LAW, 26 (Dec. 2, 1996). It is
interesting to note that Texas's statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4447cc, is virtually
identical to the audit bill that is currently being proposed by the New York State
Assembly.
115
See WLF PaperAccuses EPA of Blackmail in CampaignAgainst State
Audit Laws, AIR/WATER POLLUTION REPORT'S ENVIRON. WEEK, 34 (Sept. 9,

1996).

See Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,710 (1995). These
violations also include those that reflect criminal conduct or repeated
noncompliance, or allow one company to make a substantial profit at the expense
of its law-abiding competitors. Id.
117
See WLF PaperAccuses EPA of Blackmail in CampaignAgainst State
Audit Laws, supra note 115. See also Christopher Davey, Pollution Bill Brings
WarningEPA May Take Over Ohio Enforcement, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr.
30, 1996 at B4. (The EPA has threatened to oversee the enforcement of air
pollution regulations if Ohio legislators approve a privilege and limited immunity
bill for the state's industries); State House Approves Bill ChangingEnvironmental
Audit Law at EPA'S Request, BNA, Mar. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNAEVR File. (stating that the EPA has agreed to stop "holding up"
delegation to the state on various environmental programs, in exchange for
eliminating certain privilege provisions in Utah's self-audit report and privilege
law).
116
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federal pollution programs are enforced by state agencies under
agreements with the United States EPA. However, the EPA can
withdraw from these agreements if it feels that the state is not
fulfilling its commitment to environmental protection and
enforcement.' Administrator Carol Browner has stated that the
enactment -ofstate audit privilege laws "would cause environmental
programs delegated to states...to revert to national control at EPA."" 9
Recently, the EPA issued a memorandum to its Regional
Administrators reflecting the agency's orientation to approving new
state programs or program modifications in the face of state audit
privilege or immunity laws. 20 The EPA reiterated that access to
information of noncompliance and criminal conduct is necessary for
adequate state enforcement. Therefore, the agency expects the states
to, among others, avoid making the privilege applicable to criminal
investigations and preserve the public's rights to obtain information
about noncompliance and to report violations.' 2' With respect to state
immunity legislation, the agency will also be concerned with whether
the state has the ability to obtain immediate and complete injunctive
relief and to recover civil and criminal penalties for certain harmful
activities.'22
On January 17, 1997, the EPA released its Audit Policy
Update as well as an Audit Policy Interpretive Guidance. This
guidance document was compiled by the EPA's Office of
118

See Randall Edwards, Pollution Probe is Possible, THE COLUMBUS

DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 1997 at 1C.
119
WLF PaperAccuses EPA ofBlackmail in CampaignAgainst State Audit
Laws, supra note 115. At least three states that have enacted privilege legislation
have been pressured by the EPA: Colorado, Idaho, and Texas. Id.
120
See EPA Statement on State Enforcement, Impact of Audit
Immunity/PrivilegeLaw DatedFeb. 14, 1997, supra note 114, at 1.
121
See id. at 2.
122
See id. The EPA added that other factors in the statute may eliminate or

narrow the scope of penalty immunity, essentially meeting the EPA's concerns.
These factors include: (1)The immunity provided by the statute may be limited to
minor violations... ; and (2) The statute may include explicit provisions that make
it inapplicable to federal programs. Id.
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Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, and was an effort to clear
up questions that might arise in the application of the audit policy.I23
The new guidance stemmed from the Office's evaluation of over 24
cases that were candidates for penalty mitigation under the audit
policy and it identified 16 issues that could benefit from
clarification.' 24
One question asks at what point does an entity have to
disclose to the EPA that a violation may have occurred? 25 The
guidance document explains that disclosure must occur when "the
regulated entity.... [has] an objectively reasonable factual basis for
concluding that violations may have occurred.' 26 The EPA then
recommends that even if the existence of a violation is in doubt, the
27
entity should still disclose the potential violations.
Another question that is addressed is whether violations
disclosed to the EPA before they occur are eligible for reduced fines.
The EPA guidance states that generally, the answer is yes. For
example, if a company is unable to meet regulatory deadlines due to
a technological problem, but the company has made sincere efforts to
comply, the "EPA may mitigate the gravity-based penalty once the
violation actually occurs.', 128 Another issue that the EPA guidance
document seeks to clarify is whether the policy would apply to any
violations found through the compliance certification process
required under Title V of the Clean Air Act in order to obtain a
stationary source permit. The agency says generally, no; but
123
See EPA Guidance Document Addresses Fine Points of Audit Policy
Interpretation,BNA, Jan. 22, 1997, availablein LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAEVR

File. The Guidance is also available on the OECA's homepage (last visited May
28, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/envirosense/oeca/epapolguid.html>. See also 60
Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).

See id,
See Spirit of the Law Won't be Enough to Satisfy EPA Audit Policy,
According to New Interpretive Guidance,supra note 49.
124
125

126

Id.

See id.
EPA Guidance Document Addresses Fine Points of Audit Policy
Interpretation,supra note 123.
127

129
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exceptions may be made if the company can demonstrate that it
exceeded the requirements under Title V.' 29 The agency's guidance
document also elaborated on when its policy on environmental audits
can lead to reduced fines for companies. According to the EPA, the
penalty mitigation policy will apply when violations are reported
within 10 days of discovery and are promptly corrected. 3 '
The agency claims that its policy on voluntarily performed
environmental audits has been extremely successful.' 3 ' The data
reveals that the audit policy has had the desired effect on corporate
behavior, with 105 companies having disclosed violations at more
than 350 of their facilities.13 1 One company, GTE Corp., has recently
agreed to settle 600 violations discovered through a company wide
audit at 10,000 sites across the United States. 133 According to the
EPA, the company's fine will reflect the amount of money GTE
saved from its noncompliance. 34 Because GTE abided by the EPA's
environmental audit and self-disclosure policy and promptly corrected
its voluntarily discovered violations, the Agency waived any punitive
penalties. 135 Sources from the EPA have stated that the data
"indicate[s] that environmental auditing can be encouraged without
blanket amnesties or audit privileges that would excuse serious

129

See id.

130

See id See also Spirit of the Law Won't be Enough to Satisfy EPA Audit

Policy,According to New InterpretiveGuidance,supra note 49 (describing several

of the questions and answers provided in the interpretive guidance).

See Richard M. Kuntz, EPA Boasts Virtues of its Audit Policy, CHICAGO
DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Jan. 30, 1997, at 5.
132
See id See also Spiritof the Law Won't be Enough to Satisfy EPA Audit
Policy, According to New Interpretive Guidance, supra note 49 (identifying 40
131

companies that have received penalty relief under audit policy settlements).
See Company Agrees to Settle 600 Violations; Case Involves Most Sites
Ever Under Policy, BNA, Oct. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
13

BNAEVR File.

See id GTE will pay a fine of $52,264 for emergency planning and Clean
Water Act violations. Id.
135
See id. These penalties would have amounted to $2.38 million.
134
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misconduct, frustrate enforcement, encourage secrecy, boost
litigation, or lead to public distrust."' 36
B. New York State's Assembly Bill 3154
On January 30, 1997, Assemblyman Daniel J. Fessenden
introduced Assembly Bill 3154, entitled the "Environmental Audit
Privilege and Qualified Disclosure Act.', 137 If enacted, the bill would
provide an evidentiary privilege for environmental audits and penalty
immunity relief to regulated entities that voluntarily discover,
promptly report, and correct violations during an audit process. 3 '
According to Assemblyman Fessenden, the justification for
this bill is that the current system discourages audits and the
identification of environmental compliance problems since entities
are often penalized for their compliance efforts. 139 It is suggested that
legal and regulatory mechanisms that provide incentives for an entity
to conduct an audit will subsequently result in increased
environmental compliance. 4 In fact, one of the legislative
declarations for the bill states that, "[p]rotection of the environment
and industrial health and safety rests principally on the public's
voluntary compliance with environmental, health and safety laws
...[and] that voluntary compliance is most effectively achieved
through the implementation of regular self-evaluative activities such
as audits.. . ""' This argument is similar to those put forth by the
industries themselves in support of similar legislation. 2
136

Peter Fairley, EPA Claims Policy Success, CHEM.

WEEK,

Jan. 29, 1997,

at 53.
137
138

Assem. 3154, 220 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).

See NY Assembly, Memorandum in Support of Legislation. This specific

source was provided directly from Assemblyman Fessenden, and is actually from

his Assembly Bill 10345, which was introduced in March of 1996, but which is
identical to the bill he introduced this year.
139
140

141
142

See id.
See id.

Assem. 3154, § 2(1), 220' Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
See supra text accompanying notes 103-104.
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The bill defines an "EHS Audit" as a "voluntary and internal
evaluation, review, or assessment of one or more operations or
facilities, or any activity at one or more operations or facilities"
regulated under federal or state environmental, health, and safety laws
that is "designed to identify and prevent noncompliance or to improve
compliance with such statutes."' 43 The EHS Audit Report is therefore
the set of documents that is prepared as a result of the environmental
audit.'44 The New York State proposed bill grants a privilege to the
EHS Audit Reports, which may consist of notes, memoranda,
drawings, or any other information collected or developed for the
primary purpose, and in the course of, an EHS Audit.'45 However, the
privilege does not extend to documents or communications that are
required to be reported to a regulatory agency and information
obtained from an independent source.'46
The EHS Audit Report will be privileged and not subject to
discovery in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding.' 47 In
addition, if the privilege applies to a report, then it also applies to
anyone who conducted the report and anyone to whom the audit
results are disclosed, such as an employee, legal counsel, or an
independent contractor retained to address an issue raised by the EHS
audit.44 These individuals cannot be compelled to testify regarding
any matter which is addressed in a privileged part of the report.'49
The privilege against discovery of audit report materials
proposed by the bill is not absolute, however. State law enforcement

143

Assem. 3154, § 6-0101(1), 220"' Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).

See id. § 6-0101(2).
See id. An EHS Audit Report may also include: photographs, charts,
surveys, or any other information pertaining to observations, findings, opinions,
suggestions, or conclusions, as long as these materials are prepared for, and during
the course of, an environmental audit. Id.
146
See Assem. 3154, § 6-0107(1)(2)(3), 220' Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
1997). The privilege also does not apply to information obtained by observations,
144

145

sampling, or monitoring by any regulatory agency.
147
148

149

See id. § 6-0103(1).
See id. § 6-0103(2), § 6-0103(3)(A).
See id.§ 6-0103(2).
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officers may challenge the privilege by making a written request or
subpoena for disclosure of the report. 5 The industry may then make
a request for an in camera hearing by a court or an administrative law
judge within 60 days after the disclosure request is made.' The court
is given 45 days to schedule an in camera hearing to determine
whether or not the report materials are privileged.'52 After holding an
in camera review, the court may then require disclosure of the report
if: the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose, the material is
not subject to the privilege, or even if subject to the privilege, the
material shows evidence of noncompliance with federal, state, or
local environmental, health, and safety laws and the industry failed to
take corrective action within a reasonable time.'53 These exceptions
are to prevent the industry from using the audit privilege to hide
substandard or nonexistent corrective measures as well as to
encourage a reasonable attempt on the industry's part to comply with
environmental regulations.
Also, the state may seize an EHS audit report pursuant to a
lawful search warrant. 5 4 If the state utilizes this avenue to challenge
the asserted privilege, it must place the report under seal and shall file
it with the court which authorized the search warrant.' 5 However, the
state is prohibited from inspecting, reviewing, or disclosing the
contents of the report.'56 The procedures are similar to those for a
written request or subpoena. Again, the industry that is asserting the
privilege may make a request for an in camera review, and the court
will determine whether or not the privilege applies to any or all of the
EHS audit report."'

150

1997).

See Assem. 3154, § 6-0105(2)(A), 220 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
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See id.

152

See id. § 6-0105(2)(C).
See id. § 6-0105(2)()(1)(II)(III).
See id. § 6-0105(3)(A).
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154
156

See id.
See id.

157

See id. § 6-0105(3)(A)(B).
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In addition to providing a privilege against disclosure of the
audit materials, Assembly Bill 3154 also provides an immunity
provision for the person or entity who makes a "qualified"
disclosure. 5 ' The bill states, "[i]f any person or entity makes a
qualiffied] disclosure or a violation of law, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the person or entity is immune from any
administrative, civil or criminal penalties for the violation
disclosed."' 5 9 However, the disclosure is qualified in the sense that
it must first arise out of a voluntary EHS Report and must be made
promptly to the agency having regulatory authority after knowledge
of the information disclosed is obtained by the person or entity. 6 '
Also, the person or entity making the disclosure must initiate an
appropriate effort to achieve compliance, pursue compliance with due
diligence, and correct noncompliance within a reasonable time. 6'
Along with the privilege, the immunity provision of the bill
is not absolute, and penalties may be imposed in certain situations.
For example, civil penalties may be sought if the violation was
committed intentionally and willfully by the person or entity making
the disclosure. 62 Also, criminal sanctions may be imposed in two
circumstances. First, if the person committed, or aided and abetted
in the commission of, the disclosed violation intentionally and
willfully, criminal sanctions are possible. Second, criminal sanctions
may be sought against an entity if the offense was committed
intentionally and willfully by a member of the entity's management
and the entity's policies "contributed materially to the occurrence of
the violation."' 63
Assembly Bill 3154 does provide for factors which may be
used to mitigate penalties that are assigned against the person or

158

See Assem. 3154, § 6-0111, 220'"Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).

162

Id. § 6-0111(1).
See id. § 6-0111(2)(A)(B)(C).
See id. § 6-0111(2)(D).
See id. § 6-011 1(3)(A)(II).

363

Id.§ 6-0111(3)(B)(I)(II).
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160
161
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entity.'" For example, the nature of the disclosure, or efforts to
prevent violations or harm to the environment may be considered.' 65
Although these considerations are not elaborated upon in the bill, they
do seem to indicate that a person or entity who makes a sincere effort
to address and correct environmental violations revealed in an audit
report, perhaps above and beyond what is normally required under
applicable laws and regulations, will receive favorable treatment
when penalties are assigned.
New York's proposed bill draws upon the EPA's policy
regarding environmental audits. The bill's required conditions are
almost identical to the nine criteria set forth by the EPA in it's Final
Policy Statement.'66 One main difference between the agency's
statement and the proposed bill is that the EPA explains that an
auditing entity who meets these requirements may avoid a criminal
recommendation by the agency and may receive penalty reductions
only.'67 The entity does not receive immunity from penalties, as
provided for in the New York state bill.
V. Why New York State Should Reject Audit Privilege
Legislation
A. Criticisms of Statutory Audit Privileges
Despite the abundant arguments in support of statutory
privileges for audit reports, .such legislation has its inherent
weaknesses and has managed to generate a tremendous amount of
IrA

See Assem. 3154, §6-0111(4), 220" Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
See id.
166
See Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711-66,712
(1995). These nine conditions include: systematic discovery, voluntary discovery,
prompt disclosure, discovery and disclosure independent of government or third
party plaintiff, correction and remediation, [prevention of] recurrence, no repeat
violations, other violations excluded, and cooperation. See also David J. Freeman
& Gregory R. Belcamino, EPA s Audit Policy: HalfaLoaf is Better Than None,
N.Y.L. J., Feb. 15, 1996, at I (setting forth the nine conditions).
165

167

See Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
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controversy between industry and the regulatory community. On the
one hand, United States businesses and industries have stated that
they would voluntarily perform more environmental audits if they
were assured that the audit results would not be used to penalize
them, while the regulatory agencies, most notably the EPA, and the
public, have voiced concerns over barriers to public disclosure and
difficulties in enforcement if these companies are granted a privilege
or even a penalty immunity.16
Statutory privileges have been criticized on a number of
grounds. One main criticism is that these privileges are unnecessary
since Congress has plainly granted the EPA broad access to all
69
relevant information needed to enforce the environmental statutes. 1
The idea is that courts may be hesitant to grant a statutory privilege
for audit report materials since that privilege runs contrary to the
legislative intent ofthe environmental laws. The Supreme Court even
noted, "[w]e are especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an
area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant
competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself."' 70
Therefore, even if Assembly Bill 3154 does pass in New York, it is
possible that the courts will not honor the provisions since this would
mean second guessing Congress.
Another criticism of the state privilege is that it will increase
the costs of environmental enforcement."' Many of the states's
privilege legislation provides that the parties asserting or challenging
the privilege may go to court or before an administrative law judge to
have the audit report examined. For example, the New York bill

168

See EliminationofPenaltiesCouldLead to More EnvironmentalAuditing,

supra note 61.
169
See Austin, supra note 111, at 1256.
170
Id. (quoting University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189, 110 S.Ct. 577,
107 L.Ed. 2d 571 (1990)).
171

See Craig N. Johnston, An Essay on EnvironmentalAudit Privileges: The

Right Problem, the Wrong Solution, 25 ENvT. L. 335, 340 (1995). The concept
is that a civil enforcement case would cause the EPA to lose the economic
advantages it enjoys when itacts administratively.
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would allow a party to request an in camera review of its EHS Audit
Report 60 days after the state has made a written request for
disclosure of the report.1 2 Government enforcement is therefore
impeded since the state has the ultimate burden of persuasion that the
privilege does not apply and that disclosure is inappropriate. Meeting
this burden involves time and resources, and results in delay in both
civil and criminal enforcement cases. Delay in enforcement may
then lead to possibilities of criminals escaping detection. Also, the
non-complying industries would be able to continue their harmful
operations and receive competitive advantages over their peers who
are in environmental compliance. 74
A third problem with state created privilege and immunity
laws is the lack of uniformity among the states.' Companies who do
business in more than one state may be protected by a privilege in one
state but not in another due to the varying interpretations of the
statutes's terminology. 76 For example, Kansas' legislation provides
a rebuttable presumption of immunity from administrative, civil, and
criminal penalties where disclosure is made "promptly" and the entity
making the disclosure initiates remedial action in a "diligent
manner."1 77 The New York State proposed bill contains a similar
provision, but mentions "due diligence" instead. 78 The result of this
statutory language difference is the possibility that not only will
immunity laws be applied inconsistently or irregularly by the
reviewing courts, but auditing industries will be unclear as to the
privilege requirements throughout various states.'79
See Assem. 3154, §6-0111(4), 220" Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
See Johnston, supra note 171, at 340.
174
See id. at 341. Another possibility is that in cases where a privilege is
upheld, cases that would otherwise constitute viable enforcement actions might fail
due to a lack of evidence.
175
See Sorenson, supra note 5, at 496.
176
See id.
172

17

177
178

1997).
179

See id. at 508.
See Assem. 3154, § 6-0111(2)(D), 220 t' Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
See Sorenson, supra note 5, at 507.
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B. Privilege Legislation in Other States and Ensuing Criticism
Many other states have adopted either a privilege or a
privilege and immunity statute to protect the results of voluntarily
performed environmental audits, as well as the individuals who
prepare the reports.' These states, most notably Texas, Michigan,
and Idaho, have been heavily criticized by the EPA and
environmental groups for the provisions contained in their privilege
legislation.' Because New York State has not yet passed legislation
implementing a privilege or a privilege and immunity for
environmental audits, it is necessary to examine several other states
that currently have such legislation in effect in order to determine
whether or not New York should adopt such a statute.
1. Texas
In 1995, Texas passed the "Environmental, Health, and Safety
Audit Privilege Act," which was almost identical in scope to the bill
proposed by Assemblyman Fessenden for New York State." 2 The
statute granted a privilege for audit reports which effectively excluded
these reports from discovery in civil actions or criminal or
administrative proceedings. 3 In addition, certain individuals could
not be compelled to testify or produce a document regarding the
report as long as specific conditions were met.' For example, the
testimony or document must have been made during the preparation
of the audit and the person must satisfy one or more of the following
requirements: conducted the audit but did not personally witness the

180

See EnvironmentalAudits State Immunity, PrivilegeLaws Examinedfor

ConflictsAffecting DelegatedPrograms,State Daily Env. Rep. (BNA) No. 181, at
D-6 (Sept. 18, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAEVR File.
181
See discussion infra part IV.A.
182
283

184

See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc (West 1997).
See id. § 5(b)(1)(2)(3).
See id. § 5(c).
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physical events, had the results disclosed to him or her, or was a
custodian of the audit results.' 85
However, in 1997, the audit statute's privilege provisions
underwent significant amendments as a result of persistent threats by
the EPA to withhold delegation of authority for administering certain
enforcement programs.' 86 The most significant change is that audit
reports are no longer privileged in criminal proceedings.'
In
addition, the method employed to review or challenge the audit
reports has been greatly modified. When originally enacted, the Texas
statute provided that the state attorney general must have "reasonable
cause to believe a criminal offense has been committed under an
environmental or health and safety law."' 88 Then the attorney general
could obtain the audit report under a search warrant, criminal
subpoena, or relevant state discovery rules. 8 9
The Texas statute had also provided for an in camera review
procedure very similar to the New York proposed bill. 90 Now the
statute has been amended to provide greater access to information.19'
Review of the privileged documents is performed by governmental
authority, not the courts.'92 Also, an auditing entity may no longer
request an in camera review of its report to determine the extent of a
possible privilege. According to the amended statute, if information
is required to be available to the public pursuant to state or federal
law, "the governmental authority shall notify the person claiming the

185
186

See id. § 5(c)(1)(2)(A)(B)(C).
See EnvironmentalAuditing,Chemical Regulation Reporter (BNA) No.

12, at 334 (June 20, 1997), availablein LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAEVR File. At

stake was Texas's authority to administer the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System Program and Title V of the Clean Air Act, among others.

See id.
188

See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc, § 5(a) (amended 1997).
Id. § 9(a) (prior to 1997 amendments).

189

See id

190

See id. § 9(c)(d).

191

See EnvironmentalAuditing, supra note 186.,
See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN art. 4447cc, § 9 (amended 1997).
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privilege of the potential for public disclosure prior to obtaining such
information." 93
Unlike its privilege provisions, the Texas statute's immunity
provisions remained relatively intact after the 1997 amendments.
Both the proposed New York bill and the Texas audit statute contain
similar immunity provisions. The Texas statute refers to a "voluntary
disclosure," which closely resembles the "qualified disclosure" in
Assembly Bill 3154. T4 A person who makes a voluntary disclosure
of a violation of an environmental or health and safety law will be
immune from civil or administrative penalties.' 95 According to New
York's6 bill, though, the immunity will apply to criminal penalties
19

also.

The Texas statute then describes seven conditions that must
be satisfied in order for the disclosure to be considered "voluntary."
These conditions closely resemble the nine criteria set forth by the
EPA in its Final Policy Statement, which New York's bill apparently
also draws from.'97 The disclosure must first arise out of a voluntary
environmental or health and safety audit. Also, a regulatory agency
cannot have discovered the violation independently after initiating an
investigation.'9" The disclosure must then be made promptly and in
writing to the agency having regulatory authority with respect to the
violation disclosed.' 99 In addition, the person who makes the
disclosure must initiate an effort with the appropriate agency to
achieve compliance, pursue that effort with due diligence, and correct
the compliance within a reasonable time.00 Finally, the violation
must not have resulted in injury or an imminent and substantial risk

193
194
195
196
197

198
199
200

Id. § 9(c).

See Assem. 3154, § 6-0111(2), 220"' Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN art. 4447cc, § 10(a) (amended 1997).
See N.Y. Assem. 3154, § 6-0111(1).
See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711-66,712.
See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4447cc, § 10(b)(3)(4).
See id § 10b)(1)(2).
See id § 10(b)(5)(6).
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of serious injury to one or more persons at the site or off-site to
persons, property, or the environment.20'
The New York Assembly Bill will not extend the immunity
provision in situations where the violation was committed
intentionally or recklessly? 2 Texas also has a similar limitation on
the scope of the audit statute's immunity provision." 3 Civil and
administrative penalties may be imposed against the person and
against the entity. The person must have either intentionally or
knowingly committed the disclosed violation or recklessly committed
the violation, which resulted in "substantial injury to one or more
persons at the site or off-site harm to persons, property, or the
environment."' The immunity set forth in the statute will not apply
to an offense committed intentionally or knowingly by a member of
the person's management.0 5 Also, if the offense was committed
recklessly by such a member, immunity will not be available if the
person's policies or lack of prevention systems contributed materially
to the violation.20 6 Finally, penalties may be assessed where the
violation results in a substantial economic benefit over the entity's
business competitors. 0 7
The Texas audit legislation provides for factors which serve
to mitigate any penalties that may be imposed? 8 Factors such as the
voluntariness of the disclosure, remediation, and cooperation with
government officials investigating the disclosed violation, will have
an effect on the amount of penalties that are assessed against the

201

See id, § 10(b)(7) (amended 1997).

See Assem.3154, § 6-0111(3)(A)(B) 220' Gen.Assem., Reg.Sess.(N.Y.
1997). See supranotes 162-163 and accompanying text.

202

203
204
205
206
207

See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4447cc, § 10(d).
Id.§ 10(d)(1)(2).
See id. § 10(d)(3).

See id. § 10(d)(4).
See id § 10(d)(5) (amended 1997). This "competitive advantage" standard

has been criticized as being too lenient. Opponents point out that "[u]tilities don't
have any competitors." EnvironmentalAuditing, supra note 186.
208

See id. § 10(e).
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person responsible for the disclosed violation.0 9 New York's bill
would also consider similar factors in mitigating penalties against the
person or the entity.210
The Texas audit statute, including its 1997 amendments, is
suggestive evidence of how the EPA will likely react to New York's
Assembly Bill 3154 if enacted in its current form.The Texas statute
was plagued by criticisms from the agency virtually from its
inception. But even then the director of the Texas Natural Resource
Conservation recognized that the EPA was most adverse to the
privilege and the criminal immunity for intentional conduct
provisions.2 ' In addition to the EPA's disapproval of the Texas
legislation, environmental groups had voiced their concern over the
law. Together, eighty state and national organizations expressed their
view that the audit law, which was portrayed "as a bill that would
encourage regulated industries to identify and solve past pollution
problems,... has been turned on its head to help industry hide its
problems." 1 These groups requested several changes, in addition to
the removal of the privilege and immunity provisions from the audit
privilege law. The subsequent amendments to Texas' audit statute
were a result of such pressures and must serve as a lesson to be
heeded by New York legislators.

209
210

See id. § 10(e)(1)(3)(4).
See Assem. 3154, § 6-0111(4) 220" Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).

See supranotes 164-165 and accompanying text.
211
See EnvironmentalAudits State Immunity, PrivilegeLaws Examinedfor
Conflicts Affecting DelegatedPrograms,supranote 180.
212
Environmental Groups Seek Reform of Audit Privilege Law in Texas

Legislature,National Environment Daily (BNA) (Dec. 23, 1996) (describing a
letter sent to Gov. George Bush, Lt. Governor Bob Bullock, and House Speaker
Pete Laney from groups such as the Southwest Regional Office of Consumer's
Union, the Lone Star Chapter of the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund,
and the American Lung Association of Texas), availablein LEXIS, BNA Library,

BNAEVR File.
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2. Michiganr

Michigan is an example of another state that has recently
enacted privilege and immunity legislation similar to the legislation
currently being proposed in the New York State Assembly? 13 The
Michigan law also encourages businesses to perform environmental
audits by granting the entities a limited privilege for the data
contained in their audit reports as well as immunity from civil,
criminal and administrative penalties violations that are voluntarily
reported.214
Even though supporters argue that this legislation seeks to
increase voluntary compliance without compromising environmental
standards, the statute has nonetheless received heavy criticism from
the US EPA.215 The agency has even denied full coverage of
Michigan's Title V Clean Air program delegation because of the
privilege and immunity law, protesting that the new law runs contrary
to national environmental objectives and enforcement." 6 For
example, the EPA has stated that the statute's immunity provisions
prevent Michigan from assessing the necessary enforcement authority
under Title V.2 7 Title V provides the authority for Michigan to
impose a maximum penalty of $10,000 per violation per day.
However, the state's audit statute provides immunity for certain
penalties. 2 ' The EPA recognizes that Michigan may choose not to

See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.14801 (1997) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §13A.1
14801 (Callaghan 1997)).
214
See id. §§ 14802(2), 14809. See also Russell J. Harding, Weaving
Flexibility and Innovation into EPA's One-Size-Fits-All Design, WASH. LEGAL
FOUND., Feb. 7, 1997.
215
See George Weeks, Don't Expect a Pact on EnvironmentalAudit Law at
Talks Between State, EPA, DET. NEWS, Mar. 4, 1997, at C3.
216
See Harding, supra note 214.
213

See S. Lee Johnson and Kenneth C. Gold, Approval Granted for
Michigan'sROP Program,MICH. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 17, 1997, at 4.
217

218

See id.
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impose the $10,000 maximum, but argues that this decision must be
at the state's discretion.29

The EPA did announce on January 10, 1997, that it would
grant Michigan final interim approval for issuing air pollution permits

to stationary pollution sources. This final interim approval will run
through February 10, 1999?' However, if Michigan fails to address
the EPA's concerns by this date, the agency may impose sanctions
against the state, including the implementation of a stricter, EPAadministered program to implement Title V of the Clean Air Act
amendments as well as withholding federal highway funds.22
The EPA has also informed the state of Michigan that the
scope of its audit legislation is too broad. 22 According to the agency,
Section 14802 of the privilege may be interpreted as restricting access
to data and preventing testimony to determine whether a civil or
criminal violation has occurred or is likely to occur.223 The EPA has
also criticized Section 14,809 as being interpreted as prohibiting
Michigan from assessing civil penalties for violations of regulations,
permits, or consent orders, and for violations which result in serious
harm or imminent and substantial endangerment.224 In contrast, New
York's proposed privilege and immunity legislation contains a
specific provision that deals with this criticism. It states that a person
or entity who makes a voluntary disclosure of an environmental
violation will not be protected by the immunity provision of the bill

219

See id.

220

See id See also Cheryl Hogue, EnvironmentalAudits: EPA Action on

Michigan Air Program Adds to Tension Over State Audit Laws, National

Environment Daily (BNA) (Jan. 10, 1997) available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAEVR File; Johnson and Gold, supra note 217.
221
See Johnson and Gold, supra note 217, at 4.
222

See EnvironmentalAudits State Immunity, PrivilegeLaws Examinedfor

Conflicts Affecting DelegatedPrograms,supra note 180.
223

See id,

224

See id.
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adverse public
if"... significant environmental harm or a significant
225
violation."
the
by
caused
was
effect
health
In addition, the EPA stated that section 14,809 of Michigan's
law appears to ".... allow sources to retain economic benefit from a
violation ... regardless of amount or whether it was deliberately

obtained. 226 Again, New York's proposed Assembly Bill attempts
to minimize the EPA's reservations towards statutory audit
protections by stating that a presumption of a qualified disclosure
may be rebutted, and civil penalties may be imposed under law if
"...the person or entity making the disclosure realized significant
economic advantage from the violation (after taking into account the
cost of remedying the noncompliance.")227
Michigan has been informed by the EPA that is must accept
one of two actions to obtain full approval for the Clean Air Act
operating permit program. 2 ' The first option involves two steps:
narrowing the applicability of the audit law's privilege and immunity
provisions, and submitting an opinion letter from the State Attorney
General certifying that these changes will not impair Michigan's
ability to meet federal environmental enforcement standards. 229 The

second option is for Michigan to submit an attorney general opinion
certifying that the current law does not affect the enforcement
authority required for delegation of the EPA's Title V program to the
state.230
225

Assem. 3154, § 6-0111(3)(IV), 220 'Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.

1997).
226

Environmental Audits State Immunity, Privilege Laws Examined for

Conflicts Affecting DelegatedPrograms,supra note 180. See also Weeks, supra

note 214, at C3 (quoting EPA regional administrator's letter to the Director of the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality concerning the probability that the
statute's immunity provision "could give lawbreakers an economic advantage over
law-abiding competitors.").
N.Y. Assem. 3154, § 6-0111(3)(V).
See EnvironmentalAudits: EPA Action on MichiganAir ProgramAdds
to Tension Over State Audit Laws, supra note 220.
229
See id.
See id.
230
227
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Michigan has heeded the EPA's warning. On July 2, 1997,
state representatives reached an agreement with EPA officials on
amendments designed to narrow the audit law."' The proposed
amendments include, among others, eliminating privilege and
immunity for those committing criminal environmental violations;
removing penalty immunity if a company gained significant economic
benefit as a result of the violation or if the violation was an imminent
threat to the environment; and limiting the length of the audit to six
months.232 The EPA has stated that full delegation of federal
environmental programs to Michigan will be assured once the
Legislature approves the amendments. 3
3. Idaho
The state of: Idaho passed the "Environmental Audit
Protection Act" in 1995.234 Like Texas's pre-amended statute and
New York's proposed Assembly Bill, Idaho's statute contains both a
privilege for audit reports and an immunity from civil, administrative,
and criminal penalties for the preparers of the reports. According to
the Idaho state legislature, an audit privilege and an immunity from
violations of laws and rules would "encourage owners and operators
of facilities.. .to conduct voluntary internal environmental audits..
2 35
and encourage "voluntary disclosure of information.
Even though Idaho's audit legislation is intended to improve
compliance with environmental laws and regulations with the hope
that such compliance will subsequently protect the public health,
safety and welfare in the most efficient manner, 6 the future of the

231
See Michigan: Narrower Audit Law Would Clear Way for Final
Delegation Approval, EPA Says, Environment Reporter Current Developments
(BNA), at 484 (Jul. 11, 1997) available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAEVR File.
232

233

See id.
See id.
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IDAHO CODE
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Id. § 9-802(2).
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See id. § 9-802(1)(a)(c).

§ 9-801 (1997).
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Idaho Act is not promising, however, and it is unlikely that the audit
law will survive beyond next year?37 The provisions of the statute
have been attacked by the EPA almost since the act's inception. The
root of the disagreement between the agency and the state is
enforcement of the federal Clean Air Act provisions.238
In 1996, the EPA conducted hearings to determine what
changes Idaho would have to make so that its audit legislation would
not impair enforcement authority of Title V of the Clean Air Act.239
Section 502(b) of the Clean Air Act requires states to delegate
administration of the Act to certain enforcement authorities.240 The
EPA criticized the immunity and audit privilege provisions of Idaho's
law as depriving the state of "adequate authority to enforce the
requirements of Title V. .. ,24 This criticism seems to rear its head
among other states with similar audit legislation, such as Michigan.
Specifically, the agency explained that Idaho's law bars the
prosecution of "knowing" violations of Title V requirements unless
the source has previously violated the same requirements within the
past three years.242 Also, the statute precludes the assessment of civil
penalties for violations voluntarily disclosed in an audit even if the
violations result in "serious harm or risk to the public or the
3
environment.,
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However, there were several signs that Idaho's audit
legislation would not be reauthorized, irrespective of the EPA's
attacks. 2" First, Idaho's Governor stated that he would not support
extending the law in its present form, and explained that he only
signed the legislation because it contained a sunset clause.245 Also,
even the original sponsors, the Idaho Association of Commerce and
Industry indicated it will not move for reauthorization.246
At first glance, it does appear that New York's Assembly
Bill, if passed, would provide greater protection to the environment
and less of an impediment to environmental enforcement than Idaho's
law. Assembly Bill 3154 does not mention "knowing" violations with
respect to sanctions, but it does state that intentional and willful
violations by the entity or the person will not be immune from civil
or criminal penalties. 247 Also, the Assembly Bill provides that civil
penalties may be assessed if the disclosed violation results in a
"significant environmental harm or a significant adverse public health
effect..., 24 s However, the proposed bill in its current form can also
be accused of being too broad in scope. Similar to Michigan and
Texas, and most likely Idaho, New York legislators may be required
to eliminate the privilege and immunity provisions for criminal
violations to obtain the EPA's blessing.
C. Why New York State Should Reject Assembly Bill 3154
There are several arguments that can be set forth in order to
encourage the New York State legislature to reject Assembly Bill
3154 and refuse to follow the lead of other states which have enacted
privilege and immunity legislation for environmental audit results and
preparers. One central argument is that such a statute would be in
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See Alkire, supra note 237.
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See Assem. 3154, § 6-011l(3)(A)(II), (3)(B)(I)(II), 220'hGen. Assem.,
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direct conflict with the environmental philosophy currently held by
New York's government. This philosophy has expressly condoned
such statutory privileges and has supported a strengthening of
environmental enforcement by the state.
In January of this year, Governor Pataki announced his
decision to oppose audit privilege legislation for violators of
environmental laws and regulations.249 He requested the Department
of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") to review the agency's
enforcement policies and to draft recommendations for
improvement 0° John P. Cahill, the then acting Commissioner of the
DEC, announced a six-point plan which would, "demonstrate New
York's ongoing commitment to firm enforcement of environmental
laws and regulations, while ensuring that they are applied fairly and
consistently.""25
Among other points, the plan opposes audit privilege of-any
sort for violators. 2 Commissioner Cahill explained that the basis for
this opposition stems directly from the Pataki Administration, which
disapproves of environmental audit privilege proposals that "protect
regulated entities from disclosing violations revealed in internal
audits." 3 According to Cahill, such privileges effectively barricade
the regulated community from the environmental agencies and the
public by restricting their access to information concerning potential
compliance problems.254 Unlike the audit privilege proposals,
however, the New York State administration does not oppose reduced
penalties for violations that are promptly reported and corrected, since.
such a policy is consistent with the EPA's approach.255
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This plan has gained the support of the EPA, whose Regional
Administrator recently announced, "[a]udit privilege, by allowing
companies to withhold important environmental data, strikes at the
heart of both environmental enforcement and community
'
protection."256
Therefore, if the current privilege statute did pass in
New York State, it is not unreasonable to assume that the EPA would
attack the provisions as running contrary to trends in discovery, as
well as the federal government's authority to enforce environmental
laws and regulations. New York may then be faced with the
punishment of having its air and water programs revert back to the
federal level.
Another argument for rejecting an audit privilege statute in
New York State is that it appears to be unnecessary. For example,
Assembly Bill 3154 already contains a provision that will not protect
audit report results which reveal significant environmental
violations.257 Therefore, if the auditing entity uncovers such an
environmental harm, it will not be able to claim that the report's
results are privileged from discovery even if the entity voluntarily
reports the violation and takes corrective action. 258 Also, the industry
or business must, by law, report certain information to regulatory
259
agencies regardless of whether a privilege statute exists.
An alternative to the privilege legislation, and one that would
be in keeping with New York State's as well as the federal
environmental enforcement efforts, would be to solely provide an
immunity provision for the preparers of the audit report. The EPA has
stated that it will mitigate any penalties that are assessed on an
auditing entity as long as .it complies with the provisions set forth in
its Final Policy Statement.26 New York could choose to draft a bill
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See id § 6-0107(1).
260
60 Fed. Reg. at 66,706, 66,710.

306

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 5

that would provide an immunity provision only for those entities who
satisfied certain "qualified" provisions, similar to those mentioned in
Assembly Bill 3154. In other words, entities who voluntarily
discover environmental violations, promptly report them, and
undertake timely efforts to remediate and prevent future violations,
would not be subject to civil or administrative fines.
New York could then grant immunity only to those industries
who implement a plan to solve the problems they uncover and
sanction those industries who fail to take action. This option seems
much more reasonable and environmentally sound. It would, in a
sense, "reward" those industries who have behaved proactively and
have not hidden their environmental violations.
VI. Conclusion
Industries and other regulated entities are caught in an
environmental dilemma. They are faced with the desire to monitor, or
audit, their internal processes in order to ensure compliance with
environmental laws and regulations. At the same time, they are
worried that the results of these audits will be used against them in a
prosecutorial action by the government or third parties. Therefore, the
regulated entities have attempted to apply common law privileges to
protect against the disclosure of their audit report results. The
problem is that environmental audits often do not fit neatly into the
requirements of these privileges. Therefore, the industries have
looked towards state legislation as a broader source of protection
against disclosure and sanctions.
New York State has considered joining the privilege and
immunity race by proposing Assembly Bill 3154, which would
provide a privilege for audit report materials as well as immunity to
the preparers of the report who could otherwise be faced with costly
penalties. However, audit privileges in other states have been heavily
criticized by the EPA on several grounds, and New York should heed
these criticisms and reject the privilege legislation. Instead, New York
should adopt an immunity provision, which is consistent with the
EPA's Policy Statement for voluntarily performed environmental
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audits. Good actors would not be penalized for revealing and
remediating environmental violations that are uncovered during a
voluntary audit. Protection of the environment and of human health
and safety are too critical to allow industries to assert a privilege that
may be concealing harmful information.

